The Data Terpadu Kesejahteran Sosial (DTKS) is Indonesia’s social registry that was used for delivering non-contributory social protection during the COVID-19 crisis. It aims to cover of the poorest 40 per cent of the population through an on-demand approach. Integrated with the National ID system, the DTKS was strategically placed to help reach the “new poor” during the pandemic.

The Government committed IDR 203 trillion to social protection measures, equivalent to 1.2 percent of the GDP, following COVID-19, making social protection the largest component of its economic recovery package.¹ The measures combined expansion of existing non-contributory schemes with new temporary schemes. The DTKS was used to a varying degree across programs (Table 1).

Table 1: Use of DTKS vis-à-vis COVID-19 non-contributory social protection measures

Note: Excludes other measures such as tariff subsidies and public works. * = this program was in the preparatory stage prior to COVID-19.

Although the DTKS was envisioned as the main channel to target non-contributory social protection to new beneficiaries, its effectiveness was mixed. While the initial disbursement of the social protection component was slow, the budget realization rose from 31 percent in July 2020 to 95 percent in December 2020.² The setting up of new strategies while scaling up coverage resulted in implementation delays. A better preparedness of the DTKS could have enabled more timely response. The key challenges were:

• Quality of data: The DTKS was last updated in 2015, although sub-national governments are responsible for updating it quarterly. Only 113 of the country’s 514 municipalities and regencies had updated their data as per latest estimates.³ To avoid reaching the non-intended recipients, many local governments had to first update the DTKS before identifying beneficiaries.
• Coordination: Ability to coordinate government social protection measures  was constrained by the interoperability of  the National ID system and the DTKS. This resulted in overlap of beneficiaries across schemes. Data integration was also challenged by inadequate flow of data back into the DTKS from its user schemes. For instance, PKH uses the woman’s name to identify the household recipients while others (e.g., Sembako) use the household head’s name, which is not fed back into the DTKS by these programs.
• Governance: A highly decentralized governance structure that resulted in scheme fragmentation. While the DTKS is institutionally owned by the Ministry of Social Affairs, local governments maintain a village information system (sistem informasi desa, SID) as specified under Village Law. For instance, the Government of Jakarta relied on locally collected data rather than the DTKS to administer the temporary Sembako to 1.25 million families. On scrutiny, it was found that 200,000 were already recipients of the PKH and another 100,000 were eligible for other schemes as they were already registered on the DTKS.⁴ Consequently, the potential of DTKS for better coordination was undermined by institutional silos.

The COVID-19 crisis has reinforced the importance of reliable, timely and accurate updates of DTKS. Whilst data updating processes have been in place, compliance by local governments has been mixed due to difficulties involved in visiting all households (especially in remote areas), high costs, the lack of skilled enumerators in some districts and perceived lack of awareness of the benefits. As the Government revives the updating process more systematically in 2021, it will be important to secure buy-in from local governments, build their capacity and incentivize them adequately. In addition, to enhance social protection coordination and reduce duplication of efforts, the DTKS will need to interoperable with both centralized databases of non-contributory schemes and decentralized village information systems. The first step to this will be to ensure seamless interoperability with the National ID system. Lastly, as the DTKS matures, it can easier respond to emergencies in a timelier manner if it is linked to the population registry and disaster damage assessments.

Further reading:

• Schaefer, M., (2020). Life or livelihoods? Indonesia’s social policy response to COVID-19. Available at: https://socialprotection.org/discover/blog/life-or-livelihoods-indonesia%E2%80%99s-social-policy-response-covid-19
• Microsave (2020). Addressing the impact of COVID-19 on the low- and middle-income segments in Indonesia. Available at: https://www.microsave.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Addressing-the-impact-of-COVID-19-on-the-low-and-middle-income-segments-in-Indonesia_V4.pdf
• Olivia, S., Gibson, J. & , Nasrudin, R. (2020). Indonesia in the Time of Covid-19, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 56:2, 143-174, Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2020.1798581
• Sparrow, R., Dartanto, T. & Hartwig, R. (2020) Indonesia Under the New Normal: Challenges and the Way Ahead, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 56:3, 269-299, Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2020.1854079
• Van Doorn, R., Ihsan, A., Agustina, C., Yoong, P. (2020). Indonesia - Public Expenditure Review : Spending for Better Results : Main Report (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/611541588612447572/Main-Report
• Anam, K. (2020). Poor Aid Database and Distribution. https://magz.tempo.co/read/cover-story/36647/poor-aid-database-and-distribution

Footnote

1. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2020.1854079
2. https://www.adb.org/projects/documents/ino-54139-001-dpta-0
3. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2020.1854079
4. https://magz.tempo.co/read/36647/poor-aid-database-and-distribution